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The meaning of numerical probability has long been a matter of contention. Siméon Denis Poisson (1781–1840) distin-
guished between objective and subjective probabilities [12]. One recent philosophical introduction to probability lists ﬁve
competing interpretations: classical, frequency, propensity, logical, and subjective [8].
The classical and subjective interpretations both involve betting. In the classical interpretation, the probability of an event
is the correct price for a payoff that will equal one monetary unit if the event happens and zero otherwise. In the subjective
interpretation, it is the price an individual is willing to pay for this payoff.
This article explains another betting interpretation of probability. Here I call it the Ville interpretation, in recognition of
Jean André Ville (1910–1989), who ﬁrst formulated it in his book on collectives [22]. Probabilities are prices under the Ville
interpretation, just as they are under the classical and subjective interpretations. But instead of asserting that these prices
are correct in some unspeciﬁed sense (as in the classical interpretation) or that some individual will pay them (as in the sub-
jective interpretation), we assert that no strategy for taking advantage of them will multiply the capital it risks by a large
factor. The Ville interpretation derives from an older interpretation of probability, neglected in the English-language litera-
ture, which I call the Cournot interpretation after Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1801–1877). According to the Cournot interpre-
tation, the meaning of a probabilistic theory lies in the predictions that it makes with high probability.
As I explain in this article, the Ville interpretation can be applied both to ordinary additive probabilities and to the non-
additive degrees of belief of the Dempster–Shafer calculus of belief functions. It works for Dempster–Shafer degrees of belief
in ways that the subjective interpretation does not.. All rights reserved.
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This section reviews how the Ville interpretation emerges from older ideas and how it extends probability theory beyond
its classical domain to games where the probabilities given and prices offered fall short of deﬁning a probability distribution
for all events of interest. In Section 2.1, I review brieﬂy the history of the Cournot interpretation of ordinary probabilities. In
Section 2.2, I explain how the Ville interpretation is related to the Cournot interpretation. In Section 2.3, I illustrate the power
of the Ville interpretation using the example of probability forecasting, and in Section 2.4, I explain its role more generally in
game-theoretic probability.2.1. Cournot
The standard procedure for testing a probabilistic theory involves picking out an event to which the theory gives very
small probability: we reject the theory if the event happens. In fact, this seems to be the only way to test a probabilistic the-
ory. Because Cournot was the ﬁrst to state that mathematical probability makes contact with phenomena only by ruling out
events given very small probability [3, p. 58], the prediction thatan event of very small probability will not happen ð1Þ
has been called Cournot’s principle. In the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, many European scholars, including Émile Borel,
Paul Lévy, Maurice Fréchet, and Andrei Kolmogorov, contended that Cournot’s principle is fundamental to the meaning and
use of mathematical probability [20]. As Borel said, we evoke ‘‘the only law of chance” when we single out an event of very
small probability and predict it will not happen. (Or when, equivalently, we single out an event of very high probability and
predict that it will happen.) Let us call the thesis that such predictions constitute the meaning of probability the Cournot
interpretation of probability.
Cournot, Fréchet, and Kolmogorov are often called frequentists. This is misleading. These authors did believe that the
probability of an event will be approximated by the frequency with which it happens in independent trials, but they consid-
ered this ‘‘law of large numbers” a consequence of Cournot’s principle together with Bernoulli’s theorem, which gives very
high probability to the approximation holding. The true frequentists, such as John Venn, saw no sense in Bernoulli’s theorem;
probability is frequency, they believed, and so it is silly to try to prove that frequency will approximate probability [21].
Of course, events of very small probability do happen. An experiment may have a very large number of possible outcomes,
each of which has very small probability, and one of which must happen. So Cournot’s principle makes sense only if we are
talking about particular events of very small probability that are salient for some reason: perhaps because they are so simple,
perhaps because they have high probability under a plausible alternative hypothesis, or perhaps simply because they were
speciﬁed in advance. There may be a substantial number of events that are salient in this way, but this is not a problem if we
set our threshold for small probability low enough, because the disjunction of a number of events with very small probably
will still have reasonably small probability.
In order to put the Cournot interpretation into practice, we must also decide how small a probability we can neglect. This
evidently depends on the context. Borel distinguished between what was negligible at the human level, at the terrestrial
level, and at the cosmic level [2].
In using the Cournot interpretation, we must also bear in mind its role in testing and giving meaning to a probabilistic
theory as a whole. Strictly speaking, it gives direct meaning only to probabilities that are very small (the event will not hap-
pen) or very large (the event will happen). It gives no meaning to a probability of 40%, say. But when a probabilistic theory
says that many successive events are independent and all have probability 40%, it gives probabilities close to one for many
aspects of this sequence of events. Probabilistic theories in which probabilities evolve (stochastic processes) also give prob-
abilities close to one to many statements concerning what happens over time, so they can also be tested and acquire mean-
ing by Cournot’s principle.
Although it was widely accepted in continental Europe in the middle of the twentieth century, the Cournot interpretation
never gained a signiﬁcant foothold in the English-language literature, and awareness of it receded as English became the lan-
guage of science and mathematics after World War II. We ﬁnd only isolated afﬁrmations of it after about 1970. In the article
on probability in the Soviet Mathematical Encyclopedia, for example, we ﬁnd the assertion that only probabilities close to
zero or one have empirical meaning [13]. For more on the history of the Cournot interpretation see [9–11,16,20].2.2. From Cournot to Ville
When a probability distribution is used to set betting odds, there is a well known relationship between the happening of
events of small probability and the success of betting strategies. The event that a given betting strategy multiplies the capital
it risks by 1=a or more has probability a or less. Conversely for every event of probability a or less there is a bet that mul-
tiplies the capital it risks by 1=a or more if the event happens. So it is natural to consider, as an alternative to Cournot’s prin-
ciple, the principle thata strategy will not multiply the capital it risks by a large factor: ð2Þ
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Ville interpretation of probability.
Ville’s principle is equivalent to Cournot’s principle whenever a probability distribution is given for the events being con-
sidered and the two principles are made speciﬁc, with the speciﬁc event and small probability mentioned in Cournot’s prin-
ciple matching the speciﬁc strategy and large factor mentioned in Ville’s principle. But when the two principles are
considered more abstractly, without a and the particular event or strategy being speciﬁed, they differ in two important
respects:
1. Ville’s principle gives us more guidance than Cournot’s principle. It tells us to specify a strategy for betting, not merely a
single event of small probability. We found it necessary to elaborate Cournot’s principle by saying that the event of very
small probability should be speciﬁed in advance. The corresponding coda for Ville’s principle is also needed, but it is less
easily overlooked, because a betting strategy cannot be implemented unless it is speciﬁed in advance.
2. Ville’s principle has a broader scope than Cournot’s principle. Cournot’s principle applies only when there is a probability
distribution for the events under discussion. Ville’s principle applies whenever prices for gambles are given, even if these
prices fall short of deﬁning probabilities for events.
To see some of the implications of Ville’s principle giving us more guidance, consider how testing is usually implemented.
A test of a probabilistic theory usually begins with a test statistic, say TðyÞ, where y is an outcome that is to be observed. If the
theory speciﬁes a probability distribution P for y, then we reject the theory at the signiﬁcance level a when we observe a
value y such that1 In g
Because
initial cTðyÞP c;
where c is a number such that PfTðyÞP cg 6 a. Ville’s principle tells us to implement this idea in a particular way: our test
statistic is the capitalKðyÞ achieved by a speciﬁed betting strategy that starts with some initial capitalK0 and does not risk
losing more thanK0. We reject the theory at the signiﬁcance level a when we observe a value y such thatKðyÞPK0=a:
Markov’s inequality tells us that PfKðyÞPK0=ag 6 a.1
When we adopt a betting strategy with which to test a probability distribution P, we are implicitly specifying an alter-
native hypothesis Q that we can plausibly adopt if we reject P. To see that this is so, let us suppose, for simplicity, that
K0 ¼ 1 (the strategy risks one unit of capital), and that there are only ﬁnitely or countably many possible values for y. In
this case, we can deﬁne Q byQðyÞ :¼KðyÞPðyÞ: ð3ÞIt is easy to see that Q is a probability distribution: (1) QðyÞP 0 because PðyÞ is a probability andKðyÞ is the ﬁnal capital for
a betting strategy that does not risk its capital becoming negative, and (2)
P
yQðyÞ ¼ 1 because it is the expected payoff un-
der P of a gamble that costs one unit. Eq. (3) tells us that the ﬁnal capitalKðyÞ is the likelihood ratio QðyÞ=PðyÞ, a measure of
how much the observed outcome y favors Q over P.
2.3. Probability forecasting
As a ﬁrst example of how Ville’s principle and the Ville interpretation apply even when prices offered fall short of deﬁning
a probability distribution P for all events of interest, consider a game in which a forecaster announces probabilities succes-
sively, observing the outcome of each preceding event before giving the next probability.
2.3.1. Probability forecasting game
K0 :¼ 1:
FOR n ¼ 1;2; . . . ;N :
Forecaster announces pn 2 ½0;1:
Skeptic announces sn 2 R:
Reality announces yn 2 f0;1g:
Kn :¼Kn1 þ snðyn  pnÞ:
ð4Þeneral, Markov’s inequality says that a nonnegative random variable X satisﬁes
P X P EðXÞ=að Þ 6 a:
the betting strategy uses the odds set by P, the expected value of the ﬁnal capitalKðyÞ is the initial capitalK0. Because the strategy risks only the
apital, the ﬁnal capitalKðyÞ cannot be negative.
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continues for N rounds.
The number pn can be thought of as the price of a ticket that pays the amount yn. Skeptic can buy any number sn of the
tickets. Since he pays pn for each ticket and receives yn in return, his net payoff is snðyn  pnÞ. The number sn can be positive or
negative. By choosing sn positive, Skeptic buys tickets; by choosing sn negative, he sells tickets.
Within the game, the pn are simply prices. But we think of them as Forecaster’s probabilities: pn is Forecaster’s probability
that Reality will choose yn ¼ 1. On the other hand, Forecaster need not have a joint probability distribution P for Reality’s
moves y1; . . . ; yN . He simply chooses pn as he pleases at each step.
Skeptic tests Forecaster’s pn by trying to increase his capital using them as prices. If Skeptic succeeds – i.e., if he makesKN
large without risking more than his initial capitalK0, then we conclude that Forecaster is not a good probability forecaster.
Ville’s principle says that if Forecaster is a good forecaster, then Skeptic will not achieve a large value for his ﬁnal capitalKN
without risking more thanK0.
What does it mean for Skeptic not to risk more thanK0? It means that his moves do not allow Reality to make his ﬁnal
capital KN negative. Since Reality can always keep Skeptic from making money (by choosing yn ¼ 0 if sn is positive and
yn ¼ 1 if sn is negative), she can makeKN negative as soon as Skeptic letsKn become negative for any n. So in order to deny
Reality the option of makingKN negative, Skeptic must choose each sn so as to deny Reality the option of makingKn neg-
ative. By (4), this means choosing sn in the intervalKn1=pn 6 sn 6Kn1=ð1 pnÞ: ð5Þ
For brevity, let us say that Skeptic plays safely if he always chooses sn satisfying (5), and lets us call a strategy for Skeptic safe
if it always prescribes sn satisfying (5).
We can get back to classical probability by assuming that Forecaster follows a strategy based on a joint probability dis-
tribution P for y1; . . . ; yN and perhaps other events outside the game, the strategy being to set pn equal to P’s conditional prob-
ability for yn ¼ 1 given what has been observed so far. But Ville’s principle is powerful even in the absence of a speciﬁed
strategy for Forecaster. It is all we need in order to derive various relations, such as the law of the large numbers, the law
of the iterated logarithm, and the central limit theorem, that classical probability theory says will hold between the proba-
bilities p1; . . . ; pN and the outcomes y1; . . . ; yN . It turns out, for example, that Skeptic can play safely in such a way that either
the relative frequency of 1s among y1; . . . ; yN ,
PN
n¼1yn=N, approximates the average probability forecast,
PN
n¼1pn=N, or else
KN becomes very large [19, p. 125]. Because it tells us thatKN will not become very large, Ville’s principle therefore implies
that
PN
n¼1yn=N will approximate
PN
n¼1pn=N. This is a version of the law of large numbers.2.4. Game-theoretic probability
Probability forecasting is only one example where prices fall short of deﬁning a probability distribution. In many other
examples, the shortfall is substantially greater.
One class of such examples arises in ﬁnance theory, where the price for a security at the beginning of the day can be
thought of as the price for a ticket that pays what the security is worth at the end of the day. Here the roles of Forecaster
and Reality are both played by the market that sets the prices, and the role of Skeptic is played by a speculator. Over a period
of N days, they play a perfect-information game much like our probability forecasting game:
2.4.1. Market gameK0 :¼ 1.
FOR n ¼ 1;2; . . . ;N:
Market announces opening price pn 2 ½0;1Þ.
Speculator announces sn 2 R.
Market announces closing price yn 2 ½0;1Þ.
Kn :¼Kn1 þ snðyn  pnÞ.
Here sn > 0 when Speculator goes long in the security, and sn < 0 when he goes short.
A cornerstone of ﬁnance theory is the efﬁcient market hypothesis, which states that a speculator cannot expect to make
money using publicly available information. Efforts to formulate this hypothesis more precisely usually start with the ques-
tionable assumption that market prices are governed, in some sense, by a probability distribution. Ville’s principle offers an
alternative way of making the hypothesis precise: we can say that Speculator will not makeKN large while playing safely.
This version of the efﬁcient market hypothesis can be tested directly, without making any probabilistic assumptions [27]. It
also implies a number of stylized facts about ﬁnancial markets, including the
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
dt
p
effect [23] and the relation between the
volatility and average of simple returns called the CAPM [25].
Shafer and Vovk [19] give other examples of games where prices fall short of deﬁning a probability distribution. It turns
out that many of the usual results of probability theory can be extended to such games, provided that we adopt Ville’s prin-
ciple. In general, we call the study of such games game-theoretic probability.
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can multiply his capital by a large factor if some result in probability theory or ﬁnance theory does not hold. It is also fruitful,
however, to consider how Forecaster or Market can play against such strategies for Skeptic or Speculator. It turns out that
they can do this effectively, and this gives a new method of making predictions, called defensive forecasting [26,24].3. The judgement of irrelevance in updating by conditioning
How should Forecaster’s probabilities change when he learns new information?
An important school of thought, called Bayesian in recent decades, contends that when we learn A, we should update our
probability for B from PðBÞ to2 The
that wiPðA&BÞ
PðAÞ : ð6ÞThe change is called conditioning. Bayesians acknowledge that it is appropriate only if we judge A to be the only relevant
information we have learned [5, Section 11.2.2, 1, p. 45].2
In this section, I review arguments for the updating rule (6), with attention to how they account for the judgement of
relevance and irrelevance. I consider the argument originally given by Abraham De Moivre, the variation given by Bruno
de Finetti, and another variation that is based on Ville’s principle. Only the argument from Ville’s principle uses the judge-
ment of relevance.3.1. De Moivre’s argument
Abraham De Moivre was the ﬁrst to state the rule of compound probability. In the second edition of his Doctrine of Chances,
published in 1738 [6], he stated the rule as follows:
. . .the Probability of the happening of two Events dependent, is the product of the Probability of the happening of one of
them, by the Probability which the other will have of happening, when the ﬁrst shall have been consider’d as having
happen’d. . .
This rule can be writtenPðA&BÞ ¼ PðAÞPðBjAÞ; ð7Þ
where PðA&BÞ is the probability of the happening of A and B, PðAÞ is the probability of the happening of A, and PðBjAÞ is the
probability which B will have of happening, when A shall have been considered as having happened.
The 20th century abandoned De Moivre’s way of talking about probabilities. Now we call PðBjAÞ the conditional probability
of B given A, and we say that it is deﬁned by the equationPðBjAÞ :¼ PðA&BÞ
PðAÞ ; ð8Þprovided that PðAÞ– 0. This makes (7) a trivial consequence of a deﬁnition. But for De Moivre (7) was more substantive. It
was a consequence of how probability is related to price.
De Moivre gave an argument for the rule of compound probability on pp. 5–6 of his second edition. He used a language
that is somewhat unfamiliar today; he talked about the values of gamblers’ expectations. But it is true to his thinking to say
that the probability of an event is the price (or the fair price, if you prefer) for a ticket that pays 1 if the event happens and 0 if
it does not happen. (An expectation is the possession a ticket with a uncertain payoff, and its value is the price you should
pay for the ticket.) Using the language of tickets, payoffs, and price, we can express his argument as follows:
1. The price of a ticket that pays 1 if A happens is PðAÞ.
2. Assume one can buy or sell any number of such tickets, even fractional amounts. So PðAÞx is the price of a ticket that pays
x if A happens, where x is any real number. (Buying a negative amount means selling.)
3. After A happens (or everyone learns that A has happened and nothing else), PðBjAÞ is the price of a ticket that pays 1 if B
happens.
4. So starting with PðAÞPðBjAÞ, you can get 1 if A&B happens. You use the PðAÞPðBjAÞ to buy a ticket that pays PðBjAÞ if A hap-
pens, and then, if A does happen, you use the PðBjAÞ to buy a ticket that pays 1 if B also happens.
5. So PðAÞPðBjAÞ is the value of a ticket that pays 1 if A&B happens.authors just cited, de Finetti and Bernardo and Smith, go on to say that irrelevance usually fails; when we learn A we usually learn other information
ll also modify our judgement concerning B. Nevertheless, updating by (6) is widely taught and implemented.
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assumption that an expectation has a well deﬁned numerical value. Our positivist heritage demands that such numbers be
cashed out in some way that can be observed.3.2. De Finetti’s version of the argument
Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) had a way of responding to the positivist challenge. For him, probability is speciﬁc to an
individual. An individual’s probability for an event A is the price the individual sets for a ticket that returns 1 if A happens
– the price at which he is willing to trade in such tickets, buying or selling as the occasion arises.
As for the conditional probability PðBjAÞ, de Finetti proposed a betting interpretation that avoids references to a situation
after A has happened or is known to have happened. For him, PðBjAÞ is the price of a conditional ticket – the price of a ticket
that pays 1 if B happens, with the understanding that the transaction is cancelled (the price is refunded and no payoff is
made if B happens) if A does not happen.
With these interpretations, de Finetti was able to formulate a version of De Moivre’s argument that leaves aside the no-
tion of changing probabilities. We situate ourselves at the beginning of the game, as it were, and argue as follows:
1. PðAÞ is the price at which I am willing to buy or sell tickets that pay 1 if A happens.
2. I am willing to buy or sell any number of such tickets, even fractional amounts. So PðAÞx is the price I will pay for a ticket
that pays x if A happens, where x is any real number.
3. PðBjAÞ is the price I am willing to pay for a ticket that pays 1 if B happens, with the understanding that this price is
refunded if A does not happen.
4. It follows that I am willing to pay PðAÞPðBjAÞ to get back 1 if A and B both happen. You can prove this by selling me two
tickets:
 For PðAÞPðBjAÞ, a ticket that pays PðBjAÞ if A happens.
 For PðBjAÞ, a ticket that pays 1 if B and A both happen, with the price being refunded if A does not happen.
If A and B both happen, I end up with 1, less the PðAÞPðBjAÞ I paid for the ﬁrst ticket; the payoff from the ﬁrst ticket is
cancelled by the cost of the second. If A does not happen, I lose only the PðAÞPðBjAÞ, the second purchase having been can-
celled. If A happens but B does not, I again lose only the PðAÞPðBjAÞ, the cost of the second purchase being cancelled by the
payoff on the ﬁrst.
5. So PðAÞPðBjAÞ is the price I am willing to pay for 1 if A&B happens – i.e., my probability for A&B.
As a coda, we may add de Finetti’s argument for the price being unique. De Moivre had taken it for granted that the
value of a thing is unique. De Finetti, using his assumption that we are willing to buy and sell any amount, argued that
we must make the probability unique in order to prevent an opponent from extracting an indeﬁnite amount of money
from us.
De Finetti’s version of the argument comes closer to modern mathematical rigor than De Moivre’s, because it leaves aside
the notion of something being ‘‘considered as having happened”, for which De Moivre gave no set-theoretic exegesis. But
some such notion must still be used in order to extend the argument to a justiﬁcation for using conditional probabilities
as one’s new probabilities after something new is learned. We must explain why the price PðBjAÞ for the conditional ticket
on B given A should not change when A and nothing else is learned. There is a large literature on how convincingly this argu-
ment can be made; some think it requires that a protocol for new information be ﬁxed and known in advance. See [15] and
references therein.3.3. Making the argument from Ville’s principle
Ville’s principle, like Cournot’s, can usually be applied directly only to a run of events, in which a strategy has time to
multiply the capital it risks substantially (or, in the case of Cournot’s principle, we can identify an event of very small prob-
ability). So in order to apply Ville’s principle to the problem of changing probabilities that are neither very small nor very
large, we must imagine them being embedded in a longer sequence of similar probabilities for similar events. This is how
probability judgments are often made: we judge that an event is like an event in some repetitive process for which we know
probabilities [18].
In de Finetti’s picture, we make a probability judgement PðAÞ ¼ p by saying that p is the price at which we are willing
to buy or sell tickets that pay 1 if A happens. (I omit needed caveats: that we buy and sell only to people who have the
same knowledge as ourselves, that this is only the price we might be inclined to set if we were inclined to gamble, etc.)
In Ville’s picture, we make a probability judgement PðAÞ ¼ p by saying that if we do offer such bets on A, and on a se-
quence of similar events in similar but independent circumstances, then an opponent will not succeed in multiplying the
capital they risk in betting against us by a large factor. Let us abbreviate this to the statement that an opponent will not
beat the probability.
In this terminology, our task is to show that the following claim holds:
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learn A and nothing more: Then we can include PðA&BÞ=PðAÞ as a new probability for B among the probabilities
that we judge an opponent will not beat: ð9ÞIn one respect, we are following De Moivre more faithfully than de Finetti did. De Finetti’s mathematical argument is con-
cerned only with prices in a single situation. Here we propose, like De Moivre, to give an argument that relates prices over
two situations: an initial situation and a subsequent situation where our additional knowledge is A and nothing more. This is
normal for the game-theoretic framework reviewed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4; there we apply Ville’s principle to games with
many rounds.
Here is the argument for (9) from Ville’s principle:
1. An opponent will not beat the probabilities PðAÞ and PðA&BÞ. This means that a strategy for the opponent that buys and
sells tickets on A and A&B at these prices, along with similar tickets on other events, will not multiply the capital risked by
a large factor.
2. We need to show that this impossibility of multiplying the capital risked still holds for strategies that are also allowed to
use PðA&BÞ=PðAÞ as a new probability for B after A and nothing more is known.
3. It sufﬁces to show that if S is a strategy against all three probabilities (PðAÞ and PðA&BÞ in the initial situation and
PðA&BÞ=PðAÞ later), then there exists a strategy S0 against the two probabilities (PðAÞ and PðA&BÞ in the initial situation)
alone that risks no more capital and has the same payoffs as S.
4. LetM, which may be positive or negative or zero, be the amount of B ticketsS buys after learning A. To constructS0 from
S, we delete this purchase of B tickets and addM tickets on A&B and M PðA&BÞ
PðAÞ tickets on A ð10Þto S’s purchases of tickets on A and A&B in the initial situation.
 The tickets in (10) have zero net cost:MPðA&BÞ M PðA&BÞ
PðAÞ PðAÞ ¼ 0:So S0 uses the same capital in the initial situation as S.
 The payoffs of the tickets in (10) are the same as the net payoffs of the M tickets deleted from S:0 if A does not happen;
M PðA&BÞ
PðAÞ if A happens but not B;
M 1 PðA&BÞ
PðAÞ
 
if A and B both happen:so S0 uses no more capital than S after the initial situation and has the same payoffs in the end.
5. By hypothesis, S0 will not multiply the capital it risks by a large factor. So S, which risks the same capital and has the
same payoffs, does not either.
See [17] for an extension of this argument to Peter Walley’s updating principle for upper and lower previsions.
3.4. The judgement of irrelevance
The argument from Ville’s principle for using conditional probability as one’s new probability uses the role and implica-
tions of knowledge in a way that de Finetti’s argument does not.
 De Finetti argued for the conditional probability PðBjAÞ being the price in the initial situation for a conditional purchase – a
purchase of a B ticket on the condition that A happens. He then merely asserted, with no argument, that it should remain
the price for this purchase after we learn that A happens and nothing more.
 The Ville argument, in contrast, is truly an argument for PðBjAÞ being the price for a B ticket in the new situation where we
have learned that A happened and nothing more.
The Ville argument is able to bring knowledge into the story because it looks what can be accomplished by different strat-
egies. What a strategy can accomplish depends on what information is available.
It is important to understand how the caveat ‘‘nothing more” enters into the Ville argument. The argument depends on
constructing a strategy S0 for the initial situation alone that is equivalent to a strategy S that makes additional bets in the
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choice of the number M depends on it), then the construction is not possible.
We can of course relax the requirement that nothing more be known than A’s happening. The essential requirement is
that nothing more be known that can help an opponent multiply his capital. In this case, we may say that the happening
of A is our only relevant information. We may have learned many other things by the time or at the time when we learned
A, but none of them can provide further help to a strategy for betting against the probabilities.
4. Judgements of irrelevance in the Dempster–Shafer calculus
The Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions extends conditional probability to a calculus for combining probability
judgements based on different bodies of evidence. Judgements of irrelevance enter into this calculus explicitly and perva-
sively. These judgements can be explained in terms of Ville’s principle in the same way as the judgement of irrelevance
in the case of updating by conditioning on A: they are judgements that once certain information is taken into account, other
information is of no help to a strategy for betting against certain probabilities.
In this section, I list the Ville judgements of irrelevance required by various operations in the Dempster–Shafer calculus
(Section 4.1), and I discuss how attention to these judgements in applications can strengthen the calculus’s usefulness (Sec-
tion 4.2).
4.1. Basic operations
The Dempster–Shafer calculus derives from a series of articles by Dempster, recently republished along with other classic
articles on the calculus in [28]. The calculus was described in detail in [14] and reviewed in [7]. Without reviewing the exam-
ples and details readers can ﬁnd in these references, I give here an overview of four related operations: the transfer of belief,
conditioning, independent combination, and Dempster’s rule of combination. In each case, I explain the judgement of irrel-
evance involved.
I omit two other important operations, natural extension and marginalization, because they do not require judgements of
irrelevance.
4.1.1. Transfer of belief
Suppose X is a variable, whose possible values form the setX, and suppose P is a probability distribution onX, expressing
our probability judgements about the value of X. Suppose x is another variable, with the set of possible values X, for which
we do not have a probability distribution. Suppose further that C is a multivalued mapping from X to X (a mapping from X
to non-empty subsets of X). Then we can deﬁne a function Bel on subsets of X by settingBelðAÞ :¼ PfxjCðxÞ#Ag: ð11ÞA function deﬁned in this way is called a belief function. We call BelðAÞ its degree of belief in A.
We can give Bel’s degrees of belief a Ville interpretation under the following conditions:
1. The probability distribution P has a Ville interpretation: no betting strategy will beat the probabilities it gives for X.
2. The multivalued mapping C has this meaning:If X ¼ x; then x 2 CðxÞ: ð12Þ3. Learning the relationship (12) between X andx does not affect the impossibility of beating the probabilities for X. (This is
the irrelevance judgement.)
The Ville interpretation that follows from these conditions is one-sided: a strategy that buys for BelðAÞ tickets that pay 1 if
x 2 A (and makes similar bets on the strength of similar evidence) will not multiply the capital its risks by a large factor.4.1.2. Conditioning
Suppose we modify the preceding setup by allowing the subset CðxÞ of X to be empty for some x. In this case, condition
(12) tells us that the event fxjCðxÞ – ;g happened, and if we judge that we have learned nothing else that can help a strategy
beat P’s probabilities, then we are entitled to condition P on this event. This results in replacing (11) byBelðAÞ ¼ PfxjCðxÞ#A & CðxÞ – ;g
PfxjCðxÞ – ;g :The judgements of irrelevance that justify this equation can be summarized by saying that aside from the impossibility of the
x for which CðxÞ ¼ ;, learning (12) does not provide any other information that can help a strategy beat the probabilities for
X.
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Suppose P1 and P2 are probability distributions on X1 and X2, respectively, expressing our probability judgements about
the values of the variables X1 and X2, respectively. What judgement is involved when we say further that the product prob-
ability measure P1  P2 on X1 X2 expresses our probability judgement about X1 and X2 jointly?
This question is not answered simply by saying that X1 and X2 are probabilistically independent, because probabilistic
independence, in modern probability theory, is a property of a joint probability distribution for two variables, not a judge-
ment outside the mathematics that justiﬁes adopting the product distribution as a joint probability distribution for them.
De Finetti’s betting interpretation of probability does give an answer to the question: we should adopt the product dis-
tribution if learning the value of one of the variables and nothing else will not change the prices we are willing to offer on the
other variable.
The Ville interpretation gives an analogous answer: we should adopt the product distribution if we make the judgement
that knowing the value of one of the variables and nothing more would not help a strategy beat the probabilities for the other
variable.
Dempster–Shafer theory extends the idea of independent combination to belief functions, by considering two multi-
valued mappings, say a mapping C1 from X1 to non-empty subsets of X1 and a mapping C2 from X2 to non-empty subsets
of X2. Suppose C1 and C2 have these meanings, where x1 and x2 are variables that take values in X1 and X2, respectively:If X1 ¼ x; then x1 2 C1ðxÞ: ð13Þ
If X2 ¼ x; then x2 2 C2ðxÞ: ð14ÞThen we can form a belief function Bel for the pair ðx1;x2Þ:
BelðAÞ ¼ ðP1  P2Þfðx1; x2ÞjC1ðx1Þ  C2ðx2Þ#Agfor A#X1 X2. To justify this, we must make the Ville judgement justifying the formation of the product distribution P1  P2
and also the judgement that learning (13) and (14) does not help beat the probabilities given by P1 or P2. This goes beyond
the individual judgements that learning (13) does not help beat P1 and that learning (14) does not help beat P2.
4.1.4. Dempster’s rule of combination
Dempster’s rule concerns the combination of two bodies of evidence bearing on the same variable x. Given the ideas we
have just reviewed, it is most easily stated by considering two multivalued mappings from the different probability spaces to
the same space X, say C1 from ðX1;P1Þ and C2 from ðX2;P2Þ. They have the usual meaning:If X1 ¼ x; then x 2 C1ðxÞ: ð15Þ
If X2 ¼ x; then x 2 C2ðxÞ: ð16ÞEven if both C1ðx1Þ and C2ðx2Þ are always non-empty, their intersection may be empty. When we learn (15) and (16), we
learn that the event fðx1; x2Þj; – C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þg has happened.
Conditioning on the intersection being non-empty, we obtain the belief function Bel on X given byBelðAÞ :¼ ðP1  P2Þfðx1; x2Þj; – C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þ#AgðP1  P2Þfðx1; x2Þj; – C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þg :In this case, the required Ville judgements are those involved in forming the product measure, along with the judgement that
learning (15) and (16) does not help beat the probabilities given by the product measure aside from providing the informa-
tion that fðx1; x2Þj; – C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þg has happened.
4.2. Discussion
In [14], I stated that Dempster’s rule of combination is appropriate when the bodies of evidence underlying individual
belief functions are independent. The Ville judgements I have just detailed elaborate this notion of independence, in a
way that should be useful in applications.
In our various writings on belief functions and in debates with critics, Dempster and I frequently took the view that the
notions of independence and conditioning involved in Dempster’s rule are the same as in ordinary probability theory. The
analysis of this article vindicates this view in some degree, insofar as it has shown that the judgements of irrelevance re-
quired for Dempster’s rule have the same general form as judgements of irrelevance that justify the formation of product
measures in ordinary probability theory and updating by conditioning in Bayesian reasoning. The analysis has also revealed,
however, the complexity that can be involved in judgements of this general form.
The critics often demanded, of course, explanations of independence and conditioning that were consistent with de Finet-
ti’s explanation of the meaning of these concepts in the Bayesian calculus. Here I have argued that de Finetti’s explanations
are not as convincing as sometimes thought even for Bayesian updating: they justify the pricing of conditional tickets but not
the changes in price from one state of knowledge to another. In any case, they surely do not extend to the Dempster–Shafer
case, where no embedding of the rules in a static picture seems to be possible. For the process of combining evidence, we
need a more dynamic picture, which is provided by the Ville interpretation.
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or clearly wrong. It is also easy enough to construct examples in which these judgements are reasonable; I gave some such
examples in the 1980s (see for example [18]). Existing applications of the Dempster–Shafer calculus would be enriched,
however, by a systematic examination of the reasonableness of the irrelevance judgements they require. A clearer under-
standing of these judgements might also help us construct Dempster–Shafer models for complex scientiﬁc problems where
the irrelevance judgements need to justify ordinary probabilities and Bayesian reasoning seem unreasonably strong.
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